GPAD4007 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CHINA
Syllabus 2025-26 First Semester
Instructor: T.W. Ngo (E21 room 4046)
Time and Venue: Friday 10:00-12:45, E22-4011
Office Hours: Wed 11:00-12:00, Fri 15:00-16:00
Course Objectives
This course aims at achieving an advanced understanding of public sector management and administration in contemporary China. It examines the functions and works of major political and administrative institutions and analyzes the problems of the current system in maintaining effective rule and administration in China.
Intended Learning Outcomes
Students are expected to:
- acquire advanced insights about public sector management and administration in contemporary China;
- develop a critical perspective on the functions and works of major political and administrative institutions in China;
- acquire a clear knowledge about key practices in contemporary China, including the workings of the nomenklatura system, the tiao-kuai matrix, cadre responsibility system, local protectionism, tax sharing system, SOE management, and disciplinary control; and
- analyze the problems of the current system in maintaining effective rule and administration in China.
Course Structure
The course is structured into two parts:
Part I discusses the background political institutions and the system of public administration in China.
Part II focuses on specific issues of public administration, including policy making, personnel management, public finance, and decentralization. It will be organized in seminars with presentations and discussions.
Learning activities
This is a seminar course that involves a number of learning activities. Students are expected to participate actively in the following activities:
- lectures and discussions
- group projects and presentations
Assessment
Assessment is based on the following:
Class participation (10%): Students are expected to take an active part in class discussions. Attendant is obligatory during the seminar presentation.
Quiz (30%): Short quizzes will be given during class meetings at regular intervals. They will be based on lectures and class discussions.
Group project (30%): Students will be divided into groups. Each group of students is required to write a group report (not exceeding 2,000 words) on an assigned topic and present it in class. A hardcopy of the report should be handed in during the presentation.
Term paper (30%): Student are required to write a term paper (between 2,000-3,000 words) on the assigned topic. They can write it individually, or in a group of two or three (no more than three students per group). The paper should be submitted in hardcopy on 28 November 2025. Students will be asked to give a presentation of their papers.
There will be no final examination.
Recommended Textbooks
Sebastian Heilmann (ed.), China’s Political System (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
Recommended References
Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.), Contemporary China Studies (Politics), vols. 1-4 (London: SAGE Publications, 2011).
Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.), Contemporary China Studies (Economy and Society), vols. 1-4 (London: SAGE Publications, 2011).
Course assignments
Students are required to work on a group project on one of the six seminar topics. They should prepare a project report and present it in class. The length of the report should be around 2,000 words. The report should be handed in during the presentation.
Project report and presentation should be made in English. Students are encouraged to make use of multi-media tools during presentations. Students should look up relevant materials in the recommended reading list. The presentation and the project report should represent your original thoughts rather than a summary of the readings. The use of AI writing is not allowed.
Course schedule and seminar topics
22 Aug Introduction
29 Aug Administrative divisions and hierarchies
5 Sep Party and state institutions
12 Sep Party and state institutions
19 Sep Quiz 1
Key relations in party-state hierarchies
26 Sep The nomenklatura system
3 Oct The tiao-kuai system
10 Oct Quiz 2
The party-state matrix
17 Oct Seminar I: policymaking and planning
Describe the theory of fragmented authoritarianism. How are policies made under the theory of fragmented authoritarianism? How useful is the theory in understanding policymaking in China?
Suppose you were the Minister of Ecology and Environment (生態環境部). You would like to greatly reduce carbon emission in the next Five Years’ Plan. In order to do so, you would need the support of various stakeholders including governmental units responsible for heavy industries, energies, transportation, and so on. Describe the conflicting interests of different stakeholders in carbon reduction. How could a coherent policy be made under the circumstances?
24 Oct Seminar II: personnel management
Describe the cadre responsibility system. How does the system work? What are performance contracts? How effective is the system in monitoring cadre performance?
Suppose you were the party secretary of Zhuhai (珠海). What kind of annual targets would you need to fulfill in your performance contract? If you wished to get promoted to a higher position, what would you need to do to improve your profile and performance?
31 Oct Quiz 3
Seminar III: public finance
Describe the 1994 fiscal and tax reform. Why was the tax reform necessary? What are central, local, and shared taxes? How did the reform impact on local finance? How does the tax-sharing system shape the behaviour of local governments?
The prefectural city Huizhou (惠州) in the Greater Bay Area has accumulated a huge local debt over the years. What are the major causes of the local government debt? Suppose you were the new mayor of Huizhou, where could you find new sources of revenue? How would you design a rescue package to prevent a financial crisis in Huizhou?
7 Nov Seminar IV: local governance
Describe the phenomenon of local protectionism. What are the main causes of local protectionism? How does local protectionism affect the economic development of China? Is local protectionism a major cause of regional inequality in China?
Suppose you were the party secretary of Guangdong province. You were given the task of developing the Greater Bay Area into a major economic hub for innovative and high-tech industries. Explain what you would do to protect your local industries from competitors of other provinces. How could you improve the competitiveness of local enterprises? What measures would you take to attract more investments into the Greater Bay Area?
14 Nov Quiz 4
Seminar V: enterprise administration
What is a state-owned enterprise? How does it differ from an ordinary enterprise? What is the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (國資委 SASAC). How are the functions and responsibilities of SASAC? How effective is SASAC in its performance?
Suppose you were the head of SASAC, you were given the task of developing China's strategic industries – especially the semiconductor and computer chips sector. What would you do in promoting the innovative capacity of Chinese semiconductor manufacturers? How could you raise the global competitiveness of made-in-China semiconductors?
21 Nov Seminar VI: redress of administrative grievances
How can ordinary Chinese citizens express their grievances when they are wrongly treated by the government? What official channels are available for citizens to launch their complaints? Describe the works of the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (信訪局). What are the limitations faced by the Bureau in addressing administrative grievances?
Suppose you were a local resident in Shanghai. During the COVID pandemic, the district government forced a mandatory lockdown in your residential area. This resulted in severe personal damage and casualties in some families. You and your neighbours decided to defend your rights against administrative malpractices and to claim compensation from the Shanghai authorities. Describe the actions you were planning to take. How effective would you envisage such actions? What were the risks involved in these actions?
28 Nov Term paper presentation: corruption and its prevention
Students will present their term papers on the problem of corruption and anti-corruption measures in class.
Term Paper Topic
Students are required to write a term paper, either individually or in a group of two/three. The paper should be around 2,000-3,000 words (including notes and references). The submission deadline is 28 November 2025. Please hand in your hardcopy to the Department Office (E21-4041).
Why does corruption persist in China despite harsh penalties and high-profile anti-corruption campaigns? Using the topics covered in seminars I-VI, analyse the factors which contribute to rampant corruption in China. What institutions are responsible for combating corruption? Based on the discussions during the seminars, explain why such institutions fail to eradicate corruption.
Readings for the Seminar Topics
Burns, John P. (2006), “The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System as a Leadership Selection Mechanism: An Evaluation,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London: Routledge), pp. 33–58.
Cai, Yongshun (2004), “Managed Participation in China,” Political Science Quarterly, 119(3): 425–451.
Cartier, C. (2001), “’Zone Fever’, the Arable Land Debate, and Real Estate Speculation: China’s Evolving Land Use Regime and Its Geographical Contradictions,” Journal of Contemporary China, 10 (28), 445-469.
Chan, Hon S. and Gao, Jie (2018), “The Politics of Personnel Redundancy: The Non-leading Cadre System in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” China Quarterly 235: 622-643.
Cheng, Yi-Wen Cheng and Ngo, Tak-Wing (2014), “The Heterodoxy of Governance under Decentralization: Rent-Seeking Politics in China’s Tobacco Growing Areas,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44 (2): 221-240.
Chien, Shiuh-Shen (2008), “The Isomorphism of Local Development Policy: A Case Study of the Formation and Transformation of National Development Zones in Post-Mao Jiangsu, China,” Urban Studies, 45 (2), 273-294.
Chuang, Julia (2014), “China’s Rural Land Politics: Bureaucratic Absorption and the Muting of Rightful Resistance,” China Quarterly 219: 649-669.
Dickson, Bruce J. (2000–01), “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political Science Quarterly, 115(4): 517–540.
Edin, Maria (2003), “Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China,” China: An International Journal, 1(1): 1–15.
Gong, Ting (2006), “Corruption and Local Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in Market Reform,” Pacific Review, 19(1): 85-102
Gong, Ting and Ma, Stephen, eds. (2009), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity, (London: Routledge), various chapters.
Han, Heejin (2020), “From Fragmentation to Centralization in Policymaking: An Explanation for the Expansion of China’s Civilian Nuclear Energy,” Environmental Policy and Governance, 1-10.
Heilmann, Sebastian (2008), “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process,” The China Journal, 59: 1–30.
Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten and Feng, Xingyuan (2004), “Competitive Governments, Fiscal Arrangements, and the Provision of Local Public Infrastructure in China: A Theory-driven Study of Gujiao Municipality,” China Information, 18 (3): 373–428.
Howell, Jude (2006), “Reflections on the Chinese State,” Development and Change, 37(2): 273-97.
Huang, Yasheng (2002), “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective,” Political Studies, 50: 61–79.
Jones, Lee and Zeng, Jinghan (2019), “Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Beyond ‘Grand Strategy’ to a State Transformation Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 40 (8): 1415-1439.
Landry, Pierre F. (2008), Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chs 1&2.
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (1992), “The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Lampton, David M. (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 1–30.
Lin, George C.S. and Yi, Fangxin (2011), “Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization of Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China,” Urban Geography 32 (1): 50-79.
Lu, Xiaobo (2000), “Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China,” Comparative Politics, 32(3): 273–294.
Mertha, Andrew (2005), “China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The China Quarterly, 184: 791–810.
Mertha, Andrew (2009), “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Liberalization in the Chinese Policy Process,” China Quarterly 200: 995-1012.
Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi and Weigast, Barry R. (1995), “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics, 48 (1): 50-81.
Ngo, Tak-Wing (2009), “Rent Seeking under the Licensing State: The Institutional Sources of Economic Corruption in China,” in Ting Gong and Ma, Stephen K. (eds), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity (London: Routledge).
Ngo, Tak-Wing, Yin, Cunyi, and Tang, Zhilin. (2017), “Scalar Restructuring of the Chinese State: The Subnational Politics of Development Zones,” Environment and Planning C (Politics and Space), 35(1): 57-75.
Oksenberg, Michel and Tong, James (1991), “The Evolution of Central–Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971–1984: The Formal System,” The China Quarterly, 125: 1–32.
Oi, Jean C. (1992), “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics, 45(1): 99-126.
Pan, Fenghua et.al. (2017), “Development by Borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional Competition, Land Finance and Local Debt Accumulation in China,” Urban Studies 54 (4): 897-916.
Qi, Rui, Chenchen Shi, and Mark Wang (2021), “The over-cascading system of cadre evaluation and China’s authoritarian resilience,” China Information 35 (1): 67–88.
Saich, Tony (2002), “The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in China,” in Tomba, Luigi (ed.), East Asian Capitalism: Conflicts, Growth and Crisis (Milano: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli), 75–99.
Tsai, Wen-Hsuan and Liao, Xingmiu (2020), “Mobilizing Cadre Incentives in Policy Implementation: Poverty Alleviation in a Chinese County,” China Information 34 (1): 45-67.
Wedeman, Andrew (2000), “Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries: Illegal Monies and Local Autonomy in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 9: 489-511.
Wedeman, Andrew (2003), From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 3.
Wong, Christine P.W. (1991), “Central–Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, 128: 691–715.
Yeo, Yukyung (2009), “Between Owner and Regulator: Governing the Business of China's Telecommunications Service Industry,” The China Quarterly, 200: 1013–1032.
Yeo, Yukyung (2013), “Contextualizing Corporate Governance: The Case of China's Central State Enterprise Groups,” Journal of Contemporary China, 22: 460-475.
Zhou, Xueguang (2010), “The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China,” Modern China, 36(1): 47–78.
Zhuang, Meixi (2020), “Social Accountability under Authoritarianism: Public Supervision of Local Governments in China,” China Information 34 (1): 3-23.
- Teacher: twngo, Ngo Tak Wing