GPAD4007 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: CHINA
Syllabus 2023-24 Second Semester
Instructor: T.W. Ngo (E21 room 4046)
Time and Venue: Monday 16:00-18:45, E21-1015
Office Hours: Mon 15:00-16:00, Wed 11:00-12:00
Course Objectives
This course aims at achieving an advanced understanding of public sector management and administration in contemporary China. It examines the functions and works of major political and administrative institutions and analyzes the problems of the current system in maintaining effective rule and administration in China.
Intended Learning Outcomes
Students are expected to:
- acquire advanced insights about public sector management and administration in contemporary China;
- develop a critical perspective on the functions and works of major political and administrative institutions in China;
- acquire a clear knowledge about key practices in contemporary China, including the workings of the nomenklatura system, the tiao-kuai matrix, cadre responsibility system, local protectionism, tax sharing system, SOE management, and disciplinary control; and
- analyze the problems of the current system in maintaining effective rule and administration in China.
Course Structure
The course is structured into two parts:
Part I discusses the background political institutions and the system of public administration in China.
Part II focuses on specific issues of public administration, including policy making, personnel management, public finance, and decentralization. It will be organized in seminars with presentations and discussions.
Learning activities
This is a seminar course that involves a number of learning activities. Students are expected to participation actively in the following activities:
- lectures and discussions
- group projects and presentations
Assessment
Assessment is based on the following:
Class participation (10%): Students are expected to take an active part in class discussions. Marks will be deducted for absence during the seminar sessions.
Group project (40%): Students will be divided into groups. Each group of students is required to write a group report (not exceeding 2,000 words) on an assigned topic and present it in class. A hardcopy of the report should be handed in during the presentation.
Term paper (50%): Each student is required to write an individual term paper (between 2,000-3,000 words) on the assigned topic. The paper should be submitted in hardcopy on 22 April 2024. Students will be randomly selected to give a presentation of their papers. There will be no extra written examination.
Recommended Textbooks
Sebastian Heilmann (ed.), China’s Political System (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
Recommended References
Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.), Contemporary China Studies (Politics), vols. 1-4 (London: SAGE Publications, 2011).
Tak-Wing Ngo (ed.), Contemporary China Studies (Economy and Society), vols. 1-4 (London: SAGE Publications, 2011).
Course assignments and schedules
Students are required to work on a group project on one of the six seminar topics. They should prepare a project report and present it in class. The length of the report should not exceed 2,000 words. The report has to be handed in during the presentation.
Project report and presentation should be made in English. Students are encouraged to make use of multi-media tools during presentation. Students should look up relevant materials in the recommended reading list. The presentation and the project report should represent your original thoughts rather than a summary of the readings.
8 Jan 2024 Introduction
15 Jan 2024 Administrative divisions and hierarchies
22 Jan 2024 Party institutions
29 Jan 2024 State institutions
19 Feb 2024 The nomenklatura
26 Feb 2024 Party-state matrix and the tiao-kuai system
4 Mar 2024 Seminar I: policymaking and planning
Describe the theory of fragmented authoritarianism. How useful is the theory in offering an understanding of policymaking in China?
Suppose you were the Minister of Ecology and Environment (生態環境部). You would like to greatly reduce carbon emission in the next Five Years’ Plan. In order to do so, you would need the support of various stakeholders. Describe the process which you need to go through to turn it into a national policy of high priority, and explain how your understanding of fragmented authoritarianism would help you to navigate this process.
11 Mar 2024 Seminar II: the cadre responsibility system
Describe the cadre responsibility system. How effective is the system in monitoring cadre performance?
You were the party secretary of Jiangmen (江門), a prefectural city in the Greater Bay Area. You were eager to get promoted or to be transferred to a more challenging city. Describe what you would do to ensure that the annual performance targets of Jiangmen were met so that your performance appraisal could be improved.
18 Mar 2024 Seminar III: public finance
Analyze the impact of the 1994 fiscal and tax reform on local finance in China. How does the tax-sharing system shape the behaviour of local governments?
You were the mayor of Huizhou (惠州), a prefectural city in the Greater Bay Area. Your city had accumulated a huge local debt over the years. This problem was compounded by the collapse of the real estate sector. Design a rescue package to prevent a financial crisis in your city finance.
25 Mar 2024 Seminar IV: local protectionism
Describe the phenomenon of local protectionism and analyze its institutional origins. Is local protectionism a major source of regional inequality in China?
You were the mayor of Chongqing Municipality (重慶市). You were given the task to develop Chongqing into a major hub for the automobile industry. Explaining how you would go about to compete with other major centres of automobile manufacturing in China. Specify the kinds of policies and resources which the municipal government could utilize to achieve the goal.
8 Apr 2024 Seminar V: SOEs administration
Describe the works of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (國資委 SASAC). How effective is SASAC in performing its supervisory role on state-owned enterprises?
As head of the commission, you were given the task of developing China's strategic industries – especially the 5G semiconductor sector – into global businesses along the One Belt One Road Initiative. Describe your plans to achieve this goal.
15 Apr 2024 Seminar VI: administrative grievances and disciplinary control
Describe the works of the State Bureau for Letters and Visits (信訪局). What are the limitations faced by the Bureau in addressing administrative grievances?
You were a local resident in Shanghai. During the pandemic, the district government had forced a mandatory lockdown in your residential area. This resulted in personal damages and casualties in some families. You and your neighbours decided to defend your rights against administrative malpractices and to claim compensation from the authorities. Describe the actions you were planning to take, and give an estimation about the effectiveness of such actions.
22 Apr 2024 Term paper presentation 1
Students will present their term papers on the problem of corruption and anti-corruption measures in class.
29 Apr 2024 Term paper presentation 2
Students will present their term papers on the problem of corruption and anti-corruption measures in class.
Term Paper Topic
Each student is required to write a term paper on the following topic. The paper should be around 2,000-3,000 words (including notes and references). The submission deadline is 22 April 2024.
What are the factors which contribute to rampant corruption in China? Which institutions are responsible for combating corruption? Do you think the current anti-corruption campaign will be effective in eradicating official corruption? What kinds of institutional reforms do you think will be needed in order to ensure a clean government in the long run?
Readings for the Seminar Topics
Burns, John P. (2006), “The Chinese Communist Party’s Nomenklatura System as a Leadership Selection Mechanism: An Evaluation,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Zheng Yongnian (eds), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (London: Routledge), pp. 33–58.
Cai, Yongshun (2004), “Managed Participation in China,” Political Science Quarterly, 119(3): 425–451.
Cartier, C. (2001), “’Zone Fever’, the Arable Land Debate, and Real Estate Speculation: China’s Evolving Land Use Regime and Its Geographical Contradictions,” Journal of Contemporary China, 10 (28), 445-469.
Chan, Hon S. and Gao, Jie (2018), “The Politics of Personnel Redundancy: The Non-leading Cadre System in the Chinese Bureaucracy,” China Quarterly 235: 622-643.
Cheng, Yi-Wen Cheng and Ngo, Tak-Wing (2014), “The Heterodoxy of Governance under Decentralization: Rent-Seeking Politics in China’s Tobacco Growing Areas,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44 (2): 221-240.
Chien, Shiuh-Shen (2008), “The Isomorphism of Local Development Policy: A Case Study of the Formation and Transformation of National Development Zones in Post-Mao Jiangsu, China,” Urban Studies, 45 (2), 273-294.
Chuang, Julia (2014), “China’s Rural Land Politics: Bureaucratic Absorption and the Muting of Rightful Resistance,” China Quarterly 219: 649-669.
Dickson, Bruce J. (2000–01), “Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation,” Political Science Quarterly, 115(4): 517–540.
Edin, Maria (2003), “Remaking the Communist Party-State: The Cadre Responsibility System at the Local Level in China,” China: An International Journal, 1(1): 1–15.
Gong, Ting (2006), “Corruption and Local Governance: The Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in Market Reform,” Pacific Review, 19(1): 85-102
Gong, Ting and Ma, Stephen, eds. (2009), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity, (London: Routledge), various chapters.
Han, Heejin (2020), “From Fragmentation to Centralization in Policymaking: An Explanation for the Expansion of China’s Civilian Nuclear Energy,” Environmental Policy and Governance, 1-10.
Heilmann, Sebastian (2008), “From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s Distinctive Policy Process,” The China Journal, 59: 1–30.
Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten and Feng, Xingyuan (2004), “Competitive Governments, Fiscal Arrangements, and the Provision of Local Public Infrastructure in China: A Theory-driven Study of Gujiao Municipality,” China Information, 18 (3): 373–428.
Howell, Jude (2006), “Reflections on the Chinese State,” Development and Change, 37(2): 273-97.
Huang, Yasheng (2002), “Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective,” Political Studies, 50: 61–79.
Jones, Lee and Zeng, Jinghan (2019), “Understanding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’: Beyond ‘Grand Strategy’ to a State Transformation Perspective,” Third World Quarterly 40 (8): 1415-1439.
Landry, Pierre F. (2008), Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chs 1&2.
Lieberthal, Kenneth G. (1992), “The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” in Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Lampton, David M. (eds), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 1–30.
Lin, George C.S. and Yi, Fangxin (2011), “Urbanization of Capital or Capitalization of Urban Land? Land Development and Local Public Finance in Urbanizing China,” Urban Geography 32 (1): 50-79.
Lu, Xiaobo (2000), “Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China,” Comparative Politics, 32(3): 273–294.
Mertha, Andrew (2005), “China’s ‘Soft’ Centralization: Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations,” The China Quarterly, 184: 791–810.
Mertha, Andrew (2009), “Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0: Political Liberalization in the Chinese Policy Process,” China Quarterly 200: 995-1012.
Montinola, Gabriella, Qian, Yingyi and Weigast, Barry R. (1995), “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics, 48 (1): 50-81.
Ngo, Tak-Wing (2009), “Rent Seeking under the Licensing State: The Institutional Sources of Economic Corruption in China,” in Ting Gong and Ma, Stephen K. (eds), Preventing Corruption in Asia: Institutional Design and Policy Capacity (London: Routledge).
Ngo, Tak-Wing, Yin, Cunyi, and Tang, Zhilin. (2017), “Scalar Restructuring of the Chinese State: The Subnational Politics of Development Zones,” Environment and Planning C (Politics and Space), 35(1): 57-75.
Oksenberg, Michel and Tong, James (1991), “The Evolution of Central–Provincial Fiscal Relations in China, 1971–1984: The Formal System,” The China Quarterly, 125: 1–32.
Oi, Jean C. (1992), “Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State Corporatism in China,” World Politics, 45(1): 99-126.
Pan, Fenghua et.al. (2017), “Development by Borrowing? Inter-jurisdictional Competition, Land Finance and Local Debt Accumulation in China,” Urban Studies 54 (4): 897-916.
Qi, Rui, Chenchen Shi, and Mark Wang (2021), “The over-cascading system of cadre evaluation and China’s authoritarian resilience,” China Information 35 (1): 67–88.
Saich, Tony (2002), “The Blind Man and the Elephant: Analysing the Local State in China,” in Tomba, Luigi (ed.), East Asian Capitalism: Conflicts, Growth and Crisis (Milano: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli), 75–99.
Tsai, Wen-Hsuan and Liao, Xingmiu (2020), “Mobilizing Cadre Incentives in Policy Implementation: Poverty Alleviation in a Chinese County,” China Information 34 (1): 45-67.
Wedeman, Andrew (2000), “Budgets, Extra-budgets, and Small Treasuries: Illegal Monies and Local Autonomy in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, 9: 489-511.
Wedeman, Andrew (2003), From Mao to Market: Rent Seeking, Local Protectionism, and Marketization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), ch. 3.
Wong, Christine P.W. (1991), “Central–Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China,” The China Quarterly, 128: 691–715.
Yeo, Yukyung (2009), “Between Owner and Regulator: Governing the Business of China's Telecommunications Service Industry,” The China Quarterly, 200: 1013–1032.
Yeo, Yukyung (2013), “Contextualizing Corporate Governance: The Case of China's Central State Enterprise Groups,” Journal of Contemporary China, 22: 460-475.
Zhou, Xueguang (2010), “The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China,” Modern China, 36(1): 47–78.
Zhuang, Meixi (2020), “Social Accountability under Authoritarianism: Public Supervision of Local Governments in China,” China Information 34 (1): 3-23.
- Teacher: twngo, Ngo Tak Wing